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SPECIAL FEATURE
SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON CHALLENGES IN
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW
INTRODUCTION
James C. Hathaway*
Refugee status at international law requires more than demonstration
of a risk of being persecuted. Unless the risk faced by an applicant is caus-
ally connected to one of five specified attributes – his or her race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion –
the claim to be a refugee must fail.1 Because the drafters of the Refugee
Convention believed that the world’s asylum capacity was insufficient to
accommodate all those at risk of being persecuted, they opted to confine
the class of refugees to persons whose predicament stems from who they
are, or what they believe – the very sorts of values enshrined in non-dis-
crimination law. To be sure, it is of course always wrong to persecute any-
one, for any reason. But given the determination of states not to recognize
as refugees all persons at risk of persecution, grounding the delimitation
clause in the foundational principle of non-discrimination – the corner-
stone of the international human rights system – was arguably a “least bad
option.”2
Of the five non-discrimination grounds for accessing refugee status,
the notion of risk for reasons of “political opinion” is perhaps the one that
sits most comfortably with the general understanding of who is a refugee:
indeed, it is common to refer to “political refugees” rather than to “refu-
gees” as such. Yet despite the centrality of the concept of “political opin-
ion” to refugee status, its parameters are not clearly understood.3
The classic definition of a political opinion embraces “any opinion on
any matter in which the machinery of [s]tate, government, and policy may
be engaged.”4 While it is endorsed by, for example, the Supreme Court of
* James E. and Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law and Director, Program in Refugee
and Asylum Law, University of Michigan.
1. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), Jul. 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter “Refugee Convention” or “Convention”] (entered into force Apr.
22, 1954).
2. See generally JAMES HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE
STATUS 362-461 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2014) (1991).
3. Id. at 405-23.
4. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 87 (3d ed. 2007). The definition proposed in the co-authored 2007 edition is unchanged
from that proposed in GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31
(1983).
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Canada,5 other courts have found such a broadly conceived definition to
be unwieldy. Only one month after its formal adoption by the Supreme
Court of Canada, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal expressed its
concern that this definition was so broad that it would “obviate[ ] all of the
enumerated grounds.”6 The Full Federal Court of Australia similarly
opined that a political opinion “. . . is probably narrower than the usage of
the word in connection with the science of politics, where it may extend to
almost every aspect of society.”7 And New Zealand’s Refugee Status Ap-
peals Authority has declared the classic definition to be “an unhelpful dis-
traction. . . best avoided.”8
While there is no doubt much force in these critiques, the alternative
approaches proposed have not been especially compelling. The New Zea-
land tribunal, for example, sensibly insisted that “context” is critical to an
understanding of political opinion.9 But it has yet clearly to explain how to
conduct a context-based inquiry in a way that ensures fairness between
and among variants of political opinion claims. The European Union’s
Qualification Directive provides that “. . . the concept of political opinion
shall, in particular, include the holding of an opinion, thought or belief on
a matter related to the potential actors of persecution. . . and to their poli-
cies or methods, whether or not that opinion, thought or belief has been
acted on by the applicant.”10 But surely not every opinion about the actor
of persecution is political (“I don’t like his fashion sense”), even as there
are clearly opinions that are “political” that have nothing to do with the
actor of persecution (as the “in particular” language impliedly recognizes).
And while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) has yet to offer a comprehensive view on the meaning of “po-
litical opinion,” it has, in the context of its guidance on asylum claims by
children, observed that “[a] claim based on political opinion presupposes
that the applicant holds, or is assumed to hold, opinions not tolerated by
the authorities or society and that are critical of generally accepted poli-
cies, traditions or methods.”11 While the statement is helpful as an affir-
mation that matters can be political without relating to the formal
5. Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 744 (Can.).
6. Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 3 F.C. 675
(Can.), at [26].
7. V. v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [1999] F.C.A 428, at [33].
8. Refugee Appeal No. 76339 [2010] NZ RSAA at [87] (N.Z.). This decision was up-
held on appeal: M. v. Refugee Status Appeals Authority, [2010] NZHC 1885 (NZHC, Sep.
17, 2010).
9. Refugee Appeal No. 76044 [2008] NZAR 719 at [83], [87] (N.Z.).
10. Council Directive 2011/95, art. 10(1)(e), on Standards for the Qualification of
Third-Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection, for
Uniform Status for Refugees and for Persons Eligible for Subsidiary Protection, and for the
Content of the Protection Granted (Recast), 2011 O.J. (L 337/9) (E.U.).
11. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r on Human Rights, Guidelines on International
Protection No. 8: Child Asylum Claims under Article 1(A)(2) and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention
and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/09/08 (Dec. 22,
2009), at [45].
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mechanisms of government, there is no good reason to suggest that an
opinion ceases to be “political” simply because it accords with what au-
thorities believe (“I love the ruling party”). And conversely, is it correct to
suggest that so long as the opinion isn’t tolerated and is critical it is always
“political”? Are there really no limits?
Against the backdrop of this conceptual confusion, the goal of the
Seventh Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee Law was to
develop a principled and workable framework to guide the process of as-
sessing when an individual should be understood to be at risk for reasons
of “political opinion.” Working with refugee law expert Professor Cathe-
rine Dauvergne of the University of British Columbia, a group of senior
Michigan law students first researched the issue from the perspective of
both international law and comparative state practice.12 Professor
Dauvergne then drew on this research to author a comprehensive back-
ground study which was refined by a second group of senior Michigan law
students.13 A select group of highly regarded international scholars and
jurists was then invited to meet with a third group of Michigan law stu-
dents over three days in March 2015 to debate the issues raised in the
revised background study, published in this issue, and to agree to the stan-
dards that comprise the “Michigan Guidelines on Risk for Reasons of Po-
litical Opinion.”14
It is our hope that, as in the case of earlier Michigan Guidelines on the
International Protection of Refugees,15 these unanimously agreed stan-
dards will inspire a thoughtful and principled debate among scholars, offi-
cials, and judicial and other refugee law decision-makers committed to the
legally accurate and contextually appropriate application of international
refugee law norms.
12. The members of the Comparative Asylum Law seminar in the fall of 2013 who
conducted this research were Mary Soo Anderson, Emad Ansari, Katherine Blair, Betsy
Fisher, Taylor French, Regina Garza, Matthew Justice, Fernanda Lopez Aguilar, Darren
Miller, Katie Mullins, Johnny Pinjuv, Anne Recinos, Alan Wallis, Megan Williams, and Gra-
cie Willis.
13. The members of the Refugee Law Reform seminar in the fall of 2014 who vetted
and refined the draft study were Mary Soo Anderson, Emad Ansari, Adrienne Boyd, Carol
Bundy, Cari Carson, Rosalind Elphick, Jenny Kim, Julie Kornfeld, Timothy Pavelka, Anne
Recinos, Karima Tawfik, and Kelsey VanOverloop.
14. Michigan Guidelines on Risk for Reasons of Political Opinion, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L.
233 (2015).
15. Earlier guidelines have also been published in the Michigan Journal of Interna-
tional Law. The Michigan Guidelines on the Exclusion of International Criminals, 35 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 3 (2013); The Michigan Guidelines on the Right to Work, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 293
(2010); The Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 207 (2007);
The Michigan Guidelines on Well-Founded Fear, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 491 (2005); The Michi-
gan Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention Ground, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 210 (2002); The
Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 131 (1999).
For an easily accessible collection of all previous Michigan Guidelines, see REFLAW, http://
www.reflaw.org/pral-program-2/colloquium/ (last visited June 16, 2015).
